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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of skill heterogeneity on regional patterns of pro-
duction and housing in the presence of pecuniary externalities within a general-
equilibrium framework assuming monopolistic competition at intermediate good mar-
kets. It shows that the interplay of heterogenous skills and relatively homogeneous
land demand triggers skill segmentation and agglomeration. The core region, be-
ing more attractive to high skilled workers, has a disproportionately large share of
production at all levels of the supply chain. The paper studies the eects on segmen-
tation and agglomeration of interregional trade in intermediate goods, attachment
to home, the presence of immobile unskilled workers, various conditions at local land
markets, and federal taxation.
JEL Classication: R12, R13, R14.
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35032 Marburg, Germany, eMail: wrede@wiwi.uni-marburg.de1 Introduction
At least since Marshall (1890) it is broadly accepted that skills and agglomeration are
connected. Knowledge spillovers and local availability of specic skills act as centripetal
forces. Many empirical studies have conrmed that average productivity is increasing in
local market size and population density.1 The city size elasticity of productivity ranges
from 3-8% (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Productivity in large cities is extraordinarily
higher than that found outside cities (Glaeser and Mare, 2001) and there is a substantial
wage premium associated with the largest cities and metropolitan areas (see, for Asia
and France, respectively, Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Combes et al., 2008). However, recent
studies have shown that it is not only externalities and location advantages that contribute
to the urban wage premium, but also quality selection processes (Lee, 2005; Fu and Ross,
2007; Combes et al., 2008). Since individual skills account for a substantial fraction of
spatial wage dierences, sorting by skills matters. A disproportionately large fraction of
well-educated workers live and work in large metropolitan areas (Mori and Turrini, 2005).
According to Bacolod et al. (2009), workers at the top and bottom of the skill distribution
are attracted by large cities. However, these authors also nd that average skill levels
are higher in large cities, although their estimated correlation of skills and size is only of
modest magnitude.
Since Melitz (2003) introduced rm heterogeneity into the new trade theory, thus al-
lowing for segmentation on export markets2 and in foreign direct investment (Helpman
et al., 2004), agent heterogeneity has been on the agenda in international and regional
economics. Baldwin and Okubo (2006) embedded rm heterogeneity in a standard new
economic geography framework in order to show that the biggest region attracts the most
productive rms,3 since these rms benet more from backward and forward linkages in
1There is a huge body of empirical studies on the relationship between size/density and productiv-
ity/wages including Sveikauskas (1975), Ciccone and Hall (1996), Glaeser and Mare (2001), Wheaton and
Lewis (2002), Syverson (2004), Lee (2005), Wheeler (2006), Fu and Ross (2007), Combes et al. (2008), and
Bacolod et al. (2009). For surveys, see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and, more recently, Strange (2009).
2See for endogenous mark-ups also Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
3Nocke (2003) derived similar results.
1the bigger market, but are less prone to the market-crowding eect.4
However, while the impact of rm heterogeneity on trade has been extensively studied,
heterogenous workers have attracted less interest in the theoretical regional economics lit-
erature on migration and interregional trade despite the overwhelming evidence on spatial
sorting of heterogenous workers. An exception is Mori and Turrini (2005) who showed that
skill heterogeneity within a standard new economic geography framework causes spatial
sorting and agglomeration whereas trade integration as a supplementary force increases
the degree of agglomeration. More theoretical work on skill heterogeneity needs to be done
to take into account the full spectrum of market forces analyzed within the new economic
geography framework. In particular, vertical input-output linkages between rms are con-
sidered a major reason for the endogenity of market size (see Venables, 1996; Krugman
and Venables, 1995; Puga, 1999; Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004). Vertical linkages might
support a bell-shaped curve of spatial development that could not occur in the original
core-periphery model.
In their analysis of skill heterogeneity, Mori and Turrini (2005) neglected land use
in production and housing, as well as commuting costs. Although von Th unen (1826)
early on highlighted the role of land as a main force behind dispersion, the new economic
geography literature initially omitted land use from analysis. However, Helpman (1998)
showed that land use for housing purposes may reverse the agglomeration trend in the
course of trade integration. Later, P uger and S udekum (2008) showed a bell-shaped
curve for relationship between spatial development and land use. Recently, by setting up
a monopolistic competition model with land as a productive factor, P uger and Tabuchi
(2008) demonstrated that market-size-based agglomeration forces might be too weak to
overcome the dispersion force associated with competition for land unless consumer' desire
for variety is extremely strong. Agglomeration forces other than backward and forward
linkages might be necessary to limit the impact of land use congestion on the spatial
allocation of economic activities.
The aim of this paper is to provide a general-equilibrium-based theory of segmentation
and agglomeration on a regional scale that explains two facts, namely, the existence of ag-
4Further recent studies focussing on heterogenous rms are, among others, Bernard et al. (2007),
Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2008), and Mion and Naticchioni (2009).
2glomerations despite congestion and the positive correlation of skill levels and wages with
size. To this end, we compile a two-region general-equilibrium model in which land use for
production and housing is essential. To allow for benets of size, following Fujita and Ham-
aguchi (2001), we introduce input-output linkages between rms. The model also includes
economies of scale in the intermediate good sector, benets of variety in intermediate prod-
ucts, and interregional trade costs for transporting intermediate goods. Intermediate trade
costs consist of transport costs, compliance costs associated with legal regulations, costs
related to just-in-time production at the nal good level, and so forth. Competition at the
intermediate good level is assumed to be monopolistic. Rather than modeling pecuniary
externalities, we could have considered other centripetal forces related to human capital
such as knowledge spillovers.5 However, there is some evidence that pecuniary externalities
are a more prevalent source of agglomeration than knowledge spillovers (see Ellison et al.,
2007). In addition, knowledge spillovers are spatially strictly bounded (see, e.g., Baldwin
et al., 2008) presumably excluding larger regions as units of analysis (for a survey on hu-
man capital externalities, see Moretti, 2004). As do Mori and Turrini (2005) we include
observable skill heterogeneity in the model by considering a continuum of workers with
ex-ante dierent skills. Assuming perfect mobility, we analyze whether segmentation and
agglomeration is the outcome of individual desires and market forces.
Our results can be summarized as follows:
First, the interplay of observable skill heterogeneity and (almost) homogeneous land
demand triggers skill segmentation and agglomeration. The highly-skilled live in richer
regions where aggregate human capital and aggregate output is higher. A symmetric
long-run equilibrium without segmentation would always be unstable. Household mobility
implies that wages and prices of non-tradable goods, especially land, are positively cor-
related across regions. Facing the choice between a high-wage-high-land-price region and
a low-wage-low-land-price region, highly-skilled workers prefer the former and low-skilled
workers the latter. This nding is clear without ambiguity when the individual demand
for land is independent of income (and underlying preference orderings are the same for all
workers). However, except when the income elasticity of demand for land is too high, pre-
5For a comprehensive survey on urban agglomeration economies, see Duranton and Puga (2004).
3ferred wages accompany skills. Mori and Turrini (2005) also established segmentation and
agglomeration in a regional model with skill heterogeneity,6 but in their model, where dif-
ferentiated worker-sellers produce consumer goods, land is absent. Communication costs
associated with interregional trade that fall more heavily on low-skill suppliers are the
driving force behind segmentation. These costs lead high-skilled and low-skilled workers
to make dierent location choices. Although Mori and Turrini's (2005) mechanism and
the mechanism introduced in this paper both induce segmentation and agglomeration, it
is the latter that is related to the very basic forces in spatial economics already highlighted
by von Th unen (1826). Finally, we demonstrate that skill heterogeneity combined with
market-size based agglomeration forces cause agglomeration of economic activities despite
competition for land. Thus, lack of agent heterogeneity might explain why more standard
new economic geography models are unable to establish agglomeration when land use in
production and housing is taken into account (see P uger and Tabuchi, 2008).
Second, since labor income taxes fall more heavily on cities with high productivity, high
wages and high land rents, federal taxation redistributes toward peripheral regions. From
the general-equilibrium trade model perspective, there is no rationale for redistribution to
regions that are inecient in the traded-good sector (see Albouy, 2008), however, in this
model with pecuniary externalities, federal taxation may turn out to be welfare enhancing
by reducing over-agglomeration.
Third, even though reducing intermediate trade costs increases the number of varieties
available in both regions and lowers production costs of nal goods, it also reduces the skill
advantage of the core, thus diminishing regional dierences. However, neither segmentation
nor agglomeration fully disappears provided there are some, albeit, small trade costs. In
contrast to the basic core-periphery model of Krugman (1991), but in agreement with
Helpman's (1998) model, trade integration weakens agglomeration.
Fourth, we conrm the dispersive nature of attachment to home identied by Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002). An increasing number of immobile unskilled workers who are substitutes
for mobile workers in production and/or a generally decreasing willingness to leave the
home region for higher pecuniary utility alleviate agglomeration either by directly reducing
6Abdel-Rahman (1998) also establishes segmentation in a two-skill-type-two-sector model with com-
muting where public infrastructure is the basic agglomeration force.
4dierences in aggregate skills and output or by limiting the impact of a regional wage
gap on migration ows. Consequently, relocating substitutable immobile workers from the
periphery to the core might stem the migration ow of mobile workers. However, increasing
the number of immobile workers could have the opposite eect if immobile workers are
complementary production factors that reinforce the impact of human capital on output.
Fifth, if rms' demand for land has a substantial impact on regional land prices and/or
if consumer land demand is income elastic, the core region, despite attracting more human
capital and production than the periphery, might be less densely populated. Lack of rms
and high-income workers keep land prices in the periphery relatively low, thus stemming
the ow of migration.
Our model is related to Black (1999) who set up a multi-region model with knowledge
spillovers embedded in the production function, two skill levels, and land use for housing.
The fundamental force triggering segregation in his model is the same as in our model.
Higher wages in core regions will oset higher living costs only for the highly-skilled, but
not for the low-skilled. The segregation process in his model also requires that average
productivity is increasing in average skills. However, his model diers in important aspects
from our model. First, agglomeration externalities are not the result of market forces, they
are simply imposed. Second, instead of a continuum of skill levels, there are only two types.
Consequently, the number of regions is endogenous (and larger than the number of types);
otherwise, the migration equilibrium conditions would be fullled only by chance and
agglomeration would be imposed, not derived. Assuming an endogenous number of regions,
is useful for a very long-run analysis of cities, but less suitable for the analysis of countries.
Third, in Black's model, there is always a continuum of free-mobility equilibria, making
predictions and policy analysis dicult. Accordingly, interregional redistribution policy
might be allocatively neutral. Fourth, Black (1999) didn't consider imperfect mobility
and variations in the local land market conditions. Finally, Black does not fully elaborate
on the single good market equilibrium which is, however, critical in light of cross-region
dierences in productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the basic economic model
and discusses existence, stability, and eciency of short-run and long-run equilibria, as well
as analyzing the impact on equilibria of federal taxation and trade in intermediate goods.
5Section 3 extends and modies the basic model so as to study the eects on segmentation
and agglomeration of attachment to home, the presence of immobile unskilled workers, and
various conditions at local land markets. Section 4 concludes.
2 The basic model
We consider a country comprised of two ex-ante identical regions, i = C;P. Each region is
endowed with L square miles of land. The total mass of individuals living in the country
is denoted by N. It is assumed that each person owns an identical share of land and
that total land rents, R, are equally distributed among all citizens. Each person supplies
inelastically one unit of labor in the region of residence. However, workers are heterogenous
in terms of skills. The eective labor supply of a worker of type s is simply s and gross
wage income is swi, i = C;P, where wi is the wage rate for a unit of normalized labor.
Skills are distributed according to a continuous density function f(s) with support [s;s].





We allow for a proportional federal wage tax, where tax revenue is redistributed via a
lump-sum transfer. Denoting the tax rate by t, with 0  t < 1, tax revenue is
T = t(wCSC + wPSP): (2)
Since we assume that each worker lives on one unit of land, utility of workers of type s
in region i can be written as income minus land expenses:
Ui(s) = (1   t)wis +
R + T
N
  ri; i = C;P; (3)
where ri indicates land rent { including commuting costs.
Workers are perfectly mobile. They maximize utility by choice of residence. However,
we begin our analysis by considering the short-run equilibrium for a given interregional
allocation of workers and then, in a second step, analyze the long-run equilibrium where
mobility is fully taken into consideration.
62.1 Short-run equilibrium
There are two types of goods, a nal good, Xi, and a continuum of dierentiated inter-
mediate goods, qi(j). The nal good is produced using human capital, Sxi, land, Lxi, and
the intermediate aggregate, Ii. Following Ethier (1982), Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990),
















, with  > 1, indicates the substitution elasticity of intermediate goods. The number of
varieties, ni, human capital, Sxi, and land use, Lxi, are determined endogenously. Since
the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, the number of rms and output
per rm are indeterminate. Without loss of generality, we proceed as if the total output in
every region is produced by a single representative rm that behaves competitively. The
nal good is intra- and inter-regionally traded at no cost; its price is normalized at unity. In
the basic model, intermediate goods are non-tradeable; their prices might vary by variety
and region. Furthermore, we let ri the price of land, pi(j) the price of intermediate good








; i = C;P: (5)
The representative rm chooses inputs so as to maximize prots i = X  wiSxi  riLxi  
PiIi. As a result, the demand functions for human capital, land, and intermediate goods
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Hence, per-unit costs are






i ; i = C;P; (7)
with   =   (1      ) (1  ). At equilibrium, per-unit costs are equal to the nal
good price. Hence, the nal good market equilibrium requires identical per-unit costs in
7both regions:
cC = cP = 1: (8)



















Each intermediate good is produced using only human capital. For qi(j) units of inter-
mediate goods, Sqi(j) = F + aqi(j) units of human capital are required. F indicates the
xed costs, a per-unit variable cost. If rms can dierentiate their good without cost, at
equilibrium each good will be produced by only one rm. Since there is a continuum of
varieties, the intermediate sector is characterized by monopolistic competition a l a Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977), where all rms act as if their behavior does not aect the price level.
As a consequence, each rm maximizes its prots
i(j) = pi(j)qi(j)   wi [F + aqi(j)]; i = C;P; (10)
based on the nal good sector's demand function (9) by mark-up pricing, where the mark-
up is the same for all intermediate good suppliers:





wia; i = C;P: (11)
Furthermore, free market entry enforces zero prots, which, along with the mark-up price
policy, implies that all intermediate good suppliers produce the same quantity:




The higher the substitution elasticity, the lower the price, but the greater the quantity. An
increase in xed costs and a decrease in variable costs raise the equilibrium quantity.
Taking the nal good sector's demand (9) and the intermediate good sector's zero-
prot condition (12) into account, the intermediate good market equilibrium determines {




; i = C;P: (13)
8Higher wages, higher xed costs, higher substitutability, and more varieties increase the
regional nal good production.
The number of varieties in a region is related to the stock of human capital available





[F + aqi(j)]dj = Si; i = C;P: (14)
Using the demand function of the nal good sector, Equation (9), the intermediate good
sector's zero-prot condition (12), and the formula for regional production, (13), the num-








; i = C;P: (15)
The number of varieties is proportional to the stock of human capital.
Land in each region is considered as a straight line with one unit of land at each
location. The land market is perfectly competitive. Production takes place in the central
business district (CBD) around the center.7 Since the intermediate sector does not use
land, the size of the CBD is calculated using the the nal good sector's demand for land:
2^  = (1      )Xi=ri. For simplicity, we omit transport of goods and people within the
CBD. Workers live to both, the right and the left of the CBD and it is assumed that each
worker lives on one unit of land. Commuting costs per mile, k, are constant. The rent in
the CBD is ri, starting at ^  it declines monotonically towards the edge of the inhabited
area,  . Hence, the land rent schedule can be written as a function of distance  from the
center:
ri() = maxfri   k(   ^ );rig; i = C;P: (16)
All workers pay for land use plus commuting eectively ri. In the benchmark model, we
assume that each region is large enough such that the land rent at the edge of the inhabited
area is equal to the exogenously given opportunity cost of land, rA = 0: ri  k(   ^ ) = 0.
7The urban city model simplies the analysis a lot and makes analytical solutions possible. In the next
section, we will demonstrate that most results are still valid under alternative land markets conditions.
9Furthermore, since everyone must live somewhere, the inhabited area matches population:




; i = C;P: (17)
Since land is abundant, but commuting is costly, population determines the price that the
producer must pay. Taking both the nal good sector's demand for land and the land rent
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Using the denitions of the intermediate goods price index, Equation (5), the equilibrium
price, Equation (11), the land rent, Equation (17), and the equilibrium number of varieties,
Equation (15), the international nal good market equilibrium condition, Equation (8), can
be written as



































































; i = C;P: (21)
Ceteris paribus, the regional wage increases as skills increase or population declines.
We can now dene the short-run equilibrium as, for any given interregional allocation of
workers and skills, a set of prices, namely, wages, nal good prices (normalized to unity),
intermediate goods prices, and land-rent schedules, so that intermediate good suppliers
and nal good suppliers maximize prots, workers maximize utility, and supply equals
demand in all markets, that is, land markets, intermediate goods markets and the nal
good market. Hence, the short-run equilibrium is determined by Equations (11), (17),
(16), and (21). Together with regional nal good production, (13), these equations also
10determine aggregate land rent and, therefore, worker utility. In the case where neither
population nor skills are fully agglomerated in one region, and income minus land expenses
is positive in both regions, a short-run equilibrium exists for any interregional allocation
of population and skills. Hence, if regions are somewhat similar, a short-run equilibrium
exists.
2.2 Long-run equilibrium
In the long-run, workers are mobile and choose where to live so as to maximize utility.
Hence, a long-run equilibrium is a short-run equilibrium with the additional property that
no worker can increase utility by migrating to the other region, assuming that wages, prices,
and rents do not change. In the long-run equilibrium, for all types s 2 [s;s] holds that
Ui(s)  Uk(s), k 6= i, if this worker lives in region i.
Obviously, a perfectly symmetric long-run equilibrium always exists: If half of each type
of workers live in region C and the other half in region P, the regions are identical not
only ex-ante, but also ex-post. Wages, prices, rents, and, therefore, utility for every type
of worker are the same in both regions. All markets clear and there is no incentive to
migrate. However, as Mori and Turrini (2005) stress, this type of equilibrium is essentially
unstable if the adjustment is assumed to be myopic, that is, if workers move smoothly
to the region where utility is highest. For example, if for some reason the composition
of skills changed so that aggregate skills in region C are higher than aggregate skills in
region P, but the regions are still identical in terms of pure numbers, normalized wages
in region C will exceed those in region P, but land prices in the CBD will be identical.
Thus, high-skilled workers would migrate to region C and low-skilled workers would prefer
to move to region P, reinforcing the initial dierence in skills, and ultimately resulting in
full segmentation. The symmetry-breaking result in Mori and Turrini's (2005) model is
driven by the interaction of skill heterogeneity and communication costs; here, however,
symmetry is broken by the interplay of skill heterogeneity and land demand. Labor income
depends on skills, but land demand does not. As will be shown in an extension, the crucial
point is not that land demand is fully independent of skills, but that an increase in skills
raises labor income more than the demand for land.
11In addition to the symmetric equilibrium, there exists a segmented long-run equilibrium
where all high-skilled workers live in one region and all low-skilled workers in the other.
More precisely, a segmented long-run equilibrium is a long-run equilibrium where all work-
ers of type s > ^ s live in region i and all workers of type s < ^ s live in region k, with k 6= i,
where
UC(^ s) = UP(^ s): (22)
Without loss of generality, we consider only those segmented equilibria where skilled work-





sf(s)ds; SP = S   SC; NC = N
Z s
^ s
f(s)ds; and NP = N   NC: (23)
Segmentation occurs because variation in land expenses is the same for all workers, but
labor income dierences depend on skills. UC(s)   UP(s) is increasing in s if wC > wP.
Given that wages in the core exceed those in the periphery, it is obvious that no worker
has an incentive to migrate. High-skilled workers are better o in the core and low-skilled
workers prefer to live in the periphery. Note that the critical skill level must be somewhere
in the interior, that is, s < ^ s < s, since otherwise the price of land in one region's CBD
will be zero and land demand by nal good producers cannot be dened.
To compensate workers in the periphery for lower wages, land prices in the CBD need
to be lower, too: rP < rC. Taking the relation between population and land prices, i.e.,
Equation (17), into account, lower land prices imply that the periphery is not only poor in
skills but also less densely populated than the core: NP < NC. Since the average worker in
the periphery has less human capital than the average worker in the core, the periphery's
smaller population size leads to less aggregate skills, i.e., SP < SC. Since the size of the
intermediate good market is chiey determined by labor supply, Equation (15) makes it
evident that lower aggregate human capital results in a smaller number of intermediate
good varieties: nP < nC. Along with lower wages, the smaller number of intermediate good
varieties according to Equation (13) leads to a smaller nal good sector in the periphery:
XP < XC. This is true, even though, due to the mark-up pricing rule (11), intermediate
good prices are comparatively low in the periphery: pP < pC. According to Equation (7),
12per-unit costs are the same in both regions because a larger set of varieties compensate
nal-good producer in the core for higher wages, higher land rents, and higher intermediate
good prices. Scarcity of land and heterogeneity of workers not only lead to segmentation,
but also to agglomeration. The core is more productive and also larger. However, because
land in the periphery is useful for nal good production, agglomeration is only partial.
Furthermore, a segmented long-run equilibrium exists if for some ^ s that fullls Equation













; i = C;P; (24)
when dSi=d^ s = ^ sdNi=d^ s is taken into consideration. Suppose that 1       > =(  
1) holds which calls for a large partial output elasticity of land, a small partial output
elasticity of the intermediate composite good, and a large elasticity of substitution of
intermediate varieties. Land is decisive relative to any intermediate good variety. Then,
acknowledging dNC=d^ s =  f(^ s) and ^ sNC < SC, it is evident that dwC=d^ s is positive.
The wage in the core increases as the critical skill level rises and, therefore, population
and aggregate skills shrink. By contrast, the wage in the periphery, where labor force,
aggregate skills, and average productivity increase, may change in either direction, since
^ sNP > SP. Whether the wage dierential increases or not, depends on the relative size
of SC=(^ sNC) and (NP=N)=(SP=S). On the other hand, migration from the core to the
periphery unambiguously implies a declining land rent dierential. Putting wage eects
and land rent eects together, the segmented long-run equilibrium will be stable if
(1   t)(wC   wP) +
f(^ s)N
( + )(   1)NCNPSCSP
 (25)

(1      )(   1)SCSPN

















+ kf(^ s)N > 0;
where the left-hand side is d[UC(^ s)   UP(^ s)]=d^ s. If this inequality is fullled, which is
likely, provided that 1       > =(   1), an increase in ^ s raises the utility dierential
for the critical type ^ s. A lower skill type of worker would be indierent between living in
the core and living in the periphery. Migration ows restore the equilibrium.
13Proposition 1 summarizes our results on long-run equilibria:
Proposition 1 (i) A perfectly symmetric long-run equilibrium always exists, but is essen-
tially unstable.
(ii) If a segmented long-run equilibrium exists, wages, land rents, and intermediate good
prices are higher in the core than in the periphery. The core is larger than the peripheral
region in terms of aggregate skills, population, intermediate good production, and nal good
production. Stability of the segmented long-run equilibrium is dependent on condition (25).
Due to pecuniary externalities, long-run equilibria are presumably spatially inecient.
Migration of certain groups of workers could increase welfare. Aggregate welfare, i.e., labor
income plus land rents minus commuting costs,









when the properties of short-term equilibria are fully taken into consideration.
Equation (27) makes it easy see that the symmetric long-run equilibrium is spatially
inecient. For this purpose, we compare the symmetric equilibrium with an allocation of
workers, where workers are segmented according to skills, but both regions still have equal
population. In this exercise, the right term in Equation (27) cancels out and the dierence





































Since 1 + =[( + )(   1)] > 1, the dierence in labor income is strictly positive given
that SC > S=2 > SP. In contrast to many economic geography models, in the presence of
agent heterogeneity full symmetry is clearly inecient. Agglomeration of human capital
without agglomeration of population raises welfare above the welfare level at the perfectly
symmetric equilibrium. On the one hand, congestion and commuting costs are minimized
14by symmetry in population. On the other hand, pecuniary externalities are exploited by
agglomeration. However, this segmented symmetric allocation of workers would not be a
long-run equilibrium, since workers in the periphery were not compensated for their lower
wages by lower land rents.
The segmented long-run equilibrium asymmetrically allocates not only skills but also
people. As a result, commuting costs are not minimized. Not surprisingly, the segmented
long-run equilibrium is generically also spatially inecient. Calculating the impact on



































(1   t)( + )

f(^ s)N (rP   rC):
For some parameters, this term is clearly positive, but a negative sign cannot be ruled
out analytically. As conrmed by simulations, over-agglomeration is the most likely, but
under-agglomeration appears to be possible. Whether the core will shrink or grow depends
on the relative size of commuting costs and pecuniary externalities.
Proposition 2 summarizes our ineciency results:
Proposition 2 (i) The perfectly symmetric long-run equilibrium is spatially inecient.
(ii) The segmented long-run equilibrium is also generically spatially inecient.
2.3 Federal taxation
Although interpersonal redistribution is the intended eect of progressive federal taxation,
it also has a strong spatial dimension. The federal tax is highly unequal in a geographical
sense (see Albouy, 2008), federal taxation redistributes from high-wage-high-rent regions to
low-wage-low-rent regions. Federal tax not only redistributes across regions, it also aects
the interregional allocation of workers and production. In our model, federal taxation
changes the critical skill level in the segmented long-run equilibrium. From the migration
equilibrium equation (22), it immediately follows that federal taxation increases the critical
15skill level, provided the long-run equilibrium is stable, since
@ [UC(^ s)   UP(^ s)]
@t
= (wP   wC)^ s < 0: (30)
Hence, federal taxation reduces regional dierences in population, aggregate skills, and pro-
duction. The periphery grows at the expense of the core. Whether federal taxation raises
aggregate welfare depends on the direction of spatial ineciency at the no-tax equilibrium,
and also on the tax rate. Simulations suggest that low tax rates often raise welfare by avert-
ing over-agglomeration. By extension, too high a rate can result in under-agglomeration.
2.4 Trade in intermediate goods
To this point, trade in nal goods has been taken as frictionless, but prohibitively high
barriers have foreclosed the possibility of trade in intermediate goods. In this subsection, we
look at a more realistic situation and allow trade in intermediate goods. For this purpose,
we assume iceberg costs    1 for trade in intermediate goods, with  > 1. Intermediate
good supplier export part of their output albeit at higher costs. The intermediate good



























for k 6= i, where qik(j) denotes region i's demand for quantity j produced in region k.
 = 1  indicates \trade freeness", with 0   < 1. Prot maximization of nal good











(pk) ;k 6= i: (33)
Intermediate good suppliers in region i have demand
qi(j) = qii(j) + qki(j); k 6= i: (34)
However, as is well known, mill pricing is optimal and the mark-up rule is the same as
without trade, i.e. as determined by (11). Furthermore, trade also leaves individual in-
16termediate good quantities per rm unaltered; Equation (12) still holds. But, since in-
















; k 6= i: (35)













; k 6= i: (36)
This type of equilibrium, where both regions produce intermediate and nal goods, requires
a moderate wage dierential, i.e,  < (wC=wP) < 1=. Existence calls for suciently high
trade costs.8 Since nal good demand is related to wages and quantities in both regions,







What can be said, though, is that, in contrast to separated markets for intermediate goods,
the number of varieties is not simply proportional to regional aggregate skills. Zero-prot






















1  = 1; k 6= i: (38)
Finally, it should be stressed that trade in intermediate goods has no direct impact on land
markets.
Just like in the case without trade in intermediate goods, a symmetric long-run equi-
librium always exists and a segmented long-run equilibrium exists for a wide range of
parameters. Unfortunately, Equations (37) and (38) do not allow for explicit solutions
for number of varieties and regional wages and we are thus not able to fully characterize
short-run and long-run equilibria analytically. However, the segmented long-run equilib-
rium for both the case with and without trade in intermediate goods are very similar.
Wages and land rents in the CBD of the core region exceed those in the periphery, the
8We neglect corner equilibria where nal good production or intermediate good production are concen-
trated in one region.
17core is more densely populated, and and the core has a larger stock of human capital:









C , which results in nC > nP. Together with
Equation (36), it also implies XC > XP. Hence, regardless of whether trade in interme-
diate goods is feasible, the core produces more nal and intermediate goods despite the
fact that intermediate good mill prices are higher in the core than in the periphery, i.e.
pC > pP. The following proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 3 At the segmented long-run equilibrium, even with trade in intermediate
goods, the core will be larger than the periphery in terms of aggregate skills, population,
and production. Wages, land rents, and intermediate good prices will be higher, too.
Trade eects can be analyzed numerically. To this end, we use two density functions,
f1 = 1=(s   s) and f2(s) = 1=(slns   slns). Both distributions, uniform and hyperbolic,
lead to similar simulation results.9 An increase in  raises wages in both regions, but scales
down the wage dierential, and also diminishes the interregional dierences in aggregate
skills, population, land rents, and production. Moreover, the eciency gain from reduction
in interregional trade barriers causes an increase in nal good production in both regions.
Opening interregional markets for intermediate goods increases the number of varieties
available in both regions, which, in turn, lowers the unit costs of nal goods. Production
becomes more ecient, income and utility go up across the board. However, trade integra-
tion at the intermediate good level reduces the core's skill advantage, since the periphery
is no longer cut o from the variety of intermediate goods produced in the core. Regional
dierences diminish, but they do not disappear. Although trade integration slightly damp-
ens agglomeration, even if trade were almost free, agglomeration forces would continue to
be substantial. Dispersion forces are always too weak to overcome the strong forces that
cause segmentation and, as a result, agglomeration. Skill heterogeneity combined with
far-reaching land-demand homogeneity breeds segmentation, regardless of whether there
is trade in intermediate goods.
9Simulations are available from the author on request.
183 Modications and extensions
In this section, the basic model is modied and extended in a number of ways as a way of
checking its robustness. We analyze attachment to home, the presence of immobile workers,
and alternative land use. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore trade in intermediate goods
throughout this section.
3.1 Attachment to home
In the basic model, all workers are perfectly mobile. We begin the analysis of imperfect
mobility by allowing for one important source of immobility attachment to the home re-
gion. Following, Wellisch (2000) and others, we assume that workers dier in their psychic
attachment to their home region and that the psychic utility component is additively sepa-
rable. Types are two-dimensional, a skill dimension, s, and a regional preference dimension,





UC(s) + (s)(1   ) if she lives in C:
UP(s) + (s) if she lives in P;
(39)
where (s)  0. For each skill type, the pecuniary utility Ui(s) is the same. Workers with
a small  have a preference for living in region C; workers with a large  prefer region P.
 measures the degree of household mobility. If (s) = 0, the worker is perfectly mobile,
(s) > 0 means imperfect mobility. If (s) ! 1, the worker becomes perfectly immobile.
For each type, a critical spatial preference could be calculated:














At the long-run (weakly) segmented equilibrium with attachment to home, all workers of
type (s;) live in region C if  < ^ (s) and in region P if  > ^ (s). The core's population








We assume rst that the degree of mobility is independent of the skill level: (s) = .
For uniform household mobility and wC > wP, the critical spatial parameter ^  is a mono-
tonically non-decreasing function of the skill level, since the pecuniary utility dierential
19UC(s) UP(s) is increasing in s. The fraction of highly-skilled workers living in the core is
large compared to the number of low-killed workers living there. Furthermore, an increase
in attachment to home raises the fraction of low-skilled workers, with UC(s) < UP(s), in
the core, but reduces the fraction of the highly-skilled, where UC(s) > UP(s). If attach-
ment to home is rather small, there is segmentation within skill groups only at an interval
around some critical skill level (see gure 1). Within this group, some workers live in the
core and others in the periphery. By contrast, all workers with rather high skill levels live
in the core, and all workers with quite low skills reside in the periphery. The fact that
the long-run equilibrium with attachment to home does not exhibit perfect stratication
of skill levels is pretty consistent with empirical observations.
If  ! 0, the long-run equilibrium converges to the long-run segmented equilibrium of
the basic model. If, however,  ! 1, the equilibrium approaches the perfectly symmetric
equilibrium of our basic model, since ^ (s) ! 1=2 for all skill levels. Starting at full
mobility, an increase in  leads in the core to immigration of low-skilled and emigration
of high-skilled workers. The most likely outcome is a decrease in aggregate skills in the
core and an increase of same size in the periphery. Simulations show an increasing degree
of equalization. As a result, wages in the core shrink, while wages in the periphery rise
{ provided that the implied changes in population do not overcompensate skill eects.
Agglomeration forces become weaker and regional dierences gradually disappear.10 In
other words, increasing mobility typically amplies agglomeration.
If attachment to home and skills were negatively correlated, i.e. if 0(s) < 0, low-
skilled workers would be uniformly distributed, but the highly-skilled would be skewed
toward the core. Compared to homogenous attachment to home, negative correlation of
skills and immobility should enlarge the core.
10Since both changes in population size and changes in aggregate skills aect the pecuniary utility dif-
ferential and, therefore, the critical spatial preference level for all types, it cannot be ruled out analytically
that for some levels of immobility a small increase in the attachment to home strengthens agglomeration
forces. However, simulations have always shown monotonic changes.








Figure 1: Skills and residence choices for  = 0:05: ^ (s)
3.2 Comparable immobile workers and asymmetry
We have already seen that immobility weakens agglomeration. In this subsection, we will
test the robustness of this hypothesis by considering a country that contains, along with
perfectly mobile workers, a group of perfectly immobile workers with a shared skill level.
In addition, we analyze ex-ante dierences in size.
Suppose that region i is occupied by NIi immobile workers with common skill level sI.
Apart from the dierent skill levels and the dierent degrees of mobility, immobile and
mobile workers are interchangeable. In particular, they are perfect substitutes at work.
As a consequence, their presence alters only population size and aggregate skills. In the





f(s)ds + NIi and SC = NM
Z s
^ s
sf(s)ds + sINIi; (42)
where NM is the number of mobile workers. The denitions for the periphery correspond
accordingly. The impact of immobile workers on the segmented long-run equilibrium is
inferred from the migration equilibrium condition, Equation (22). From Equation (42)











Starting at ex-ante symmetry, a small increase in the number of immobile workers in region
i reduces the wage in that region if three conditions are satised. First, the long-run
21equilibrium must be stable, i.e., the stability condition (25) is fullled. Second, 1   >
=(   1) holds. This condition also relaxes stability requirements. Third, the skills
of the immobile workers are below the average skills of mobile workers in the region,
meaning that additional immobile workers raise the number of workers, but not their
average productivity. Land prices in the CBD, being proportional to population size,
unambiguously rise. Income net of land rents and commuting expenses declines. The
region becomes less attractive to mobile workers and they emigrate.11
Proposition 4 Starting at ex-ante symmetry, a small increase in the number of immobile
workers in one region leads to emigration of mobile workers if (a) the stability condition
(25) is fullled, (b) 1       > =(   1) holds, and (c) skills of immobile workers are
below average skills of mobile workers in the respective region.
Interestingly, it is not only in the periphery that the immobile population grows at the
expense of the mobile population, but also in the core.
If the number of immobile workers grows simultaneously in both regions, the land-rent
dierential remains unchanged. Only the wage dierential would shrink. Were the number
of immobile workers ultimately quite large compared to the number of mobile workers and
were skill dierentials between mobile and immobile workers not too large, mobile workers
would have only a minor inuence on wages. Dierences between the two regions regarding
wages, population, aggregate skills, and production would all but disappear.
3.3 Complementary immobile workers and asymmetry
The eects on wages and agglomeration forces of the presence of immobile workers that
lead to complementary inputs might be quite dierent from those when workers are perfect
substitutes in production processes. To show this, we assume again that region i is occu-
pied by NIi immobile workers with skill level sI. We dene Si as regional aggregate skills
of mobile workers exclusive of immobile workers and Ni as the regional mobile population.
Since mobile and immobile workers have dierent inputs to oer, the production function
11If sI were equal to ^ s, dislocation of immobile workers from the periphery to the core ultimately would
raise both the share of immobile workers and total population in the core.







xi . Therefore, demand for immo-
bile workers' skills will be sINIi = Xi=wIi, where wIi is the immobile worker's wage. Land
markets operate as in the basic model and tax revenue is T = t
P
i=C;P (wiSi + wIisIiNIi).
Assuming that intermediate good production still relies on skilled mobile labor only, the
mark-up pricing rule of intermediate good suppliers (11), the equilibrium output per va-
riety, Equation (12), the demand rule for intermediate goods (13), and the equilibrium





















where   =    (1  ) (1  ), the nal good market equilibrium condition (8),
can be written as
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 ; i = C;P: (45)

















wi [ (Ni + NIi)   (1         )NIi]
( +  + )(Ni + NIi)NIi
; i = C;P: (47)
An increase in the immobile worker population raises the wage of mobile workers if there
are many mobile workers, the output elasticity of immobile workers is large, the output
elasticity of land is small, and/or the number of immobile workers is small. Then, under
conditions of stability, i.e., provided that d[UC(^ s)   UP(^ s)]=d^ s > 0, mobile workers immi-
grate. Otherwise, mobile workers see their pay checks shrink and emigrate. The following
proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5 Suppose the segmented long-run equilibrium is stable. A small increase in
the number of immobile workers in one region leads to immigration of mobile workers if
 (Ni + NIi) > (1         )NIi and to emigration of mobile workers otherwise.
Similarly, uniform growth of the immobile worker population in both regions may or may
not strengthen agglomeration. Simulations show that it is easy to nd parameters that
will support either agglomeration or dispersion.
233.4 Fixed area
The basic model assumed that land is abundant and thus that land prices in the CBD
were determined through commuting costs by resident demand and, therefore, directly by
population size. In this subsection, we discuss whether binding constraints on available
land change the basic pattern of segmentation and agglomeration. When all land is in
use, the nal good suppliers' demand for land, along with population size, determines land
prices in the CBD. Since L Ni units of land are available for production, the demand for
land, Equation (9), dictates the CBD land price:
ri = (1      )
Xi
L   Ni
; i = C;P: (48)
Increases in population and production will raise the price of land. Importantly, the price
of land in the CBD is no longer simply proportional to population; the relationship is now
far more complicated compared to the basic model. Multiplying land area and subtracting
commuting costs yields the aggregate regional land rent and thus














Neither the intermediate goods market nor the labor market are directly aected by the
changes in the land market, but the zero-prot conditions of nal good suppliers must be
modied. Dening























i wi; i = C;P: (51)
Hence, equilibrium wages are






i ; i = C;P: (52)
The basic structure of the short-run equilibrium remains unchanged. However, changes
in the land market have substantial implications for the long-run equilibrium. When land
is abundant, the land-price dierential rC   rP is directly determined by the dierence
24in population size; however when land is constrained, the land-price dierential rC   rP
is determined by the demand for land and thus via wages and number of varieties by
population size and aggregate skills. This has several implications: First, the stability
condition becomes more complicated. Second and most important, the core region, albeit
larger in terms of human capital and production, might be less densely populated than the
peripheral region. Land prices in the core are higher not only due to resident demand, but
also because of nal good producers' demand. Thus, compensating low land prices in the
periphery do not require a lower population density. Third, any homogenous variation in
population normally alters the land-rent dierential. However, the basic results continue to
hold true. Typically, both the perfectly symmetric long-run equilibrium and a segmented
long-run equilibrium will exist. Both are generically spatially inecient. Simulations show
that federal taxation reduces regional dierences as to population size, aggregate skills,
and production. Trade in intermediate goods has eects on agglomeration similar to those
in the basic model.
3.5 Endogenous land demand
Since the interplay between resident land demand and human capital supply is the basic
force behind segmentation, we test the robustness of our result for endogenous individual
land demand. For this purpose, we assume xed area of land and disregard commuting
costs. Assuming Cobb-Douglas utility dened on nal good consumption and as a proxy
for housing lot size, indirect utility is
Ui(s) =





; i = C;P; (53)
where 1    is the weight of land, with 0 <  < 1. Cobb-Douglas utility implies the land-
demand function Li = (1   )[(1   t)wis + (R + T)=N]=ri which exhibits unit income
elasticity. From regional land-market equilibrium conditions
L = (1      )
Xi
ri
+ (1   )




; i = C;P; (54)
25and the denition of aggregate land rent R = (rC + rP)L and tax revenue, Equation (2),




fMi(1      )(Ni + Nk) + (1   )[Mk(1      )Ni (55)






[(1      )Xi + (1   )wiSi]:
Twofold interregional redistribution from the periphery to the core is responsible for the
complexity of the land price formula. First, equal land sharing redistributes from the
high-rent region to the low-rent region. Second, federal taxation diverts income from the
high-wage region to the low wage-region. As a result, the aggregate land rent is larger than
the respective expenditure share of land calculated for gross labor income.
Intermediate goods markets and labor markets are not directly aected by consumers'
endogenous land demand, but the zero-prot conditions at the nal good level are dierent
from those conditions in the basic model. Dening,













the nal good market equilibrium condition (8), can be written as










(Si f[1   ( + )](Ni + Nk)   (1   ) (57)
( + )Nktgwi + (1   )NiSk[1   ( + )(1   t)]wk)
1   i = C;P;k 6= i:
Essential non-linearity makes explicit solutions for regional wages impossible. However,
numerical simulations show results qualitatively similar to those employing exogenous land
use by residents. Segmentation is the likely outcome of worker migration, accompanied
by agglomeration of skills and production, though the core region is sparsely populated
relative to the peripheral region.
Segmentation occurs even though high-skilled workers buy larger lots than do low-
skilled workers. To clarify the relationship between the demand for land and the prefer-
ence for the high-wage-high-rent region, suppose that (indirect) utility could be written
as V [sw;r(w)], where r(w) captures the empirical cross-region-relationship between wages




















is zero, where y is individual income and l is individual land demand. Assuming a negative
second derivative with respect to w, the more highly-skilled prefer a higher wage if
d2V [sw;r(w)]
dwds




















that is, if the skill elasticity of the demand for land is lower than 1, skills and preferred
wages are positively correlated. Taking rent income into account, Cobb-Douglas utility
meets this requirement.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed regional patterns of production and housing in the presence of pecu-
niary externalities within a general-equilibrium framework with monopolistic competition
at intermediate good markets. First, it showed that the interplay of heterogenous skills and
comparatively homogeneous land demand triggers skill segmentation and agglomeration.
The core region, being more attractive to high-skilled workers, gains a disproportionately
large share of production at all levels of the supply chain. Second, the paper demonstrated
that federal taxation that automatically redistributes toward the periphery might be wel-
fare enhancing by averting over-agglomeration. Third, the paper showed that a reduction
in intermediate trade costs weakens agglomeration by narrowing the interregional wage
gap. Fourth, it was demonstrated that rising immobility alleviates interregional dier-
ences, provided that immobile workers are not complementary factors in production. This
implies that relocating substitutable immobile workers from the periphery to the core will
initiate a countervailing migration ow of mobile workers. Fifth, the paper showed that
whenever agglomeration of labor income and production raises land prices per se, the core
may become less densely populated than the periphery.
27For clarity of exposition, the model was set-up as a two-region model, but it could be
easily extended to a multi-region model. Segregation and agglomeration would still be
triggered by wage gaps and land rent dierences. In the basic model without trade in
intermediate goods, all major results would hold true. The perfectly symmetric equilib-
rium would be unstable. At the segmented long run-equilibrium, regions could be ranked
according to aggregate skills, population size, output, wages, and land rents. Migration
would lead to a strictly monotonic relationship between average skills and size in terms of
industry and population.
Certain limitations of the model open the door to future research. Further agglomer-
ation forces, such as knowledge spillovers, could be integrated into the model. Including
imperfect competition at the nal good sector, thus inducing a market-access eect and
a cost-of living eect, would increase our understanding of the forces of segmentation and
agglomeration.
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